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This paper discusses the implications of state transactions in gold and foreign
exchange. As used here, the term government includes (a) central banks, (b)
treasuries, and (c) exchange-stabilization and exchange-control authorities.1 Gold
today is held mainly in bars of about ninety-one per cent pure metal worth roughly
$14,000. They are stored either in the government's own vaults or (especially in
recent years) on "earmark" with the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. Foreign exchange includes bank deposits abroad and holdings of
short-term securities, such as the United States treasury bills held by many foreign
governments,2 and commercial bills and acceptances, particularly in the United
Kingdom.
Foreign exchange transactions arise when importers are paying their suppliers in
-the currency of the latter or when exporters are converting their earnings abroad
into their own currency in order to cover their domestic operating expenses. Such
transactions also arise because of capital movements among countries. Investors
may purchase foreign securities because returns are higher or risks lower than those
,on domestic securities; or, having made such investments in the past, they may wish
to invest their assets at home rather than abroad.
Finally, a currency is a commodity itself as well as a means to buy commodities
,or securities. Just as domestic businesses maintain cash balances at some desired level
or some ratio to current spending (even borrowing so as to achieve this aim), so
those engaged in foreign trade (or investments) may maintain (even at the cost of
borrowing) cash balances abroad. Moreover, since world trade has been historically
financed mainly in a few centers, notably London, it has often been desirable for
traders to maintain bank balances in countries with which they actually have no
<irect commercial ties.
*The writer would like to record his thanks to J. R. T. Hughes, Jay W. Wiley, and J. Herbert
Furth for numerous suggestions and corrections in the manuscript of this paper. If errors are still
Jpresent, however, it will certainly be his fault, and not theirs.
tA.B. 1942, M.P.A. 1947, AM. 1947, Ph.D. 1952, Harvard University. Associate Professor of
Economics, Purdue University. Assistant Chief, Central and East European Section, Division of Inter-
national Finance, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1951-54. Contributor to economic and
banking publications.
a Interesting political aspects of the relations among these agencies cannot be treated in the space
.available. See, e.g., FEDRAL. R.sas.Rv SYsTraE, THE TnEnsusy--CERAr BANK REaAIoNsmP IN FoREIGN
COUNTRISu (1951).
' There is no very sharp line between short and long-term investments. It will be assumed here that
a line can be drawn between long-term investments (including equities) and short-term securities which
represent basically cash balances held in one country by residents or governments of others.
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GOVERNMENT FoRitEiG EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
Government foreign exchange transactions are intended to maintain either a par-
ticular price structure or a particular level of international transactions. The oc-
casion for such intervention is ordinarily that other events have undesired repercus-
sions in the foreign exchange markets or closely related domestic economic activities8
These events include wartime conditions, internal inflation, or depression.
The government may control foreign exchange markets in two general ways.
One way is to be a buyer (or seller) always willing to carry on any volume of trans-
actions at a stated price.4 Another way is to impose direct controls, which institute
legal penalties designed to prevent sellers (or buyers) from entering the market in
such a way as to cause the price or the volume of transactions to move from the
desired level.
A. Price-Support Operations
The currency of all countries is now mainly paper money, which is formally a
"liability" of either the government or the central bank. ("Liability" is put in quota-
tion marks, for in a country where paper money may not be converted into metallic,
it is hard to describe the practical content of the term.) It is legal tender within
the country, but not outside. If there is more than one type of currency, the various
types may not be exchangeable at par. Nominal exchange ratios can prevail only
if someone is willing and able to buy or sell any amount of one currency in ex-
change for others at these ratios7 or to restrict the holding of certain types of
money8 If several currencies are used in international payments, exchange rates
will fluctuate, unless someone maintains the rates stable, either by buying and selling
operations or by restricting the holding of these currencies.
All governments recognize that some international trade is necessary and
desirable, and they recognize that the less the fluctuations in exchange rates, the
easier will it be for traders to predict the costs and revenues from their operations,
sIn extreme cases, however, control over international transactions may be an end in itself: in the
Sino-Soviet bloc, state monopoly of foreign trade has been an important component of Marxist doctrine.
'In the same way, the United States Government controls agricultural prices by being willing to buy
unlimited amounts of produce at a support price. Sellers will not usually sell for a lower price, since
they know they may always, sell to the Government at this price.
'Similarly, the Texas Railroad Commission controls the price of crude oil by limiting the amount
of oil which any well-owner may pump in the course of a month.
' In the United States before the Civil War, the private banks which issued notes which circulated as
money were of varying soundness and reputation, and a Sxo note on one bank would not necessarily buy
the same amount of goods as a Sio note on another bank.
'7 The United States Treasury must exchange at par Sr bills (and other silver certificates) against
silver coin, and, in fact, will exchange silver certificates for Federal Reserve notes (higher denomination
paper money) in any amount.
'Thus, the United States forbids its residents to hold monetary gold inside the United States. It is
thus unnecessary for the Government to do anything internally to maintain the domestic rate of exchange
of paper money for gold at $35 to one ounce (besides enforcing the prohibition).
'Forward markets and currencies which are valid only for certain purposes are cases in point.
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and the easier, therefore, for them to conduct foreign trade. They have, in general,
preferred to stabilize exchange rates for fairly prolonged periods and to have infre-
quent (if necessary, abrupt) changes rather than frequent minor changes. ° They
have often preferred, when faced with the threat of a temporary exchange rate in-
stability, to limit entry into foreign exchange markets rather than permit actual
fluctuations in exchange rates to take place. In some cases, government agencies
have been given the sole right to hold foreign exchange.
Exchange rate policies of any one government are limited by those of others.
If any one government reduces the value of its currency, it gives its exporters and
domestic producers an advantage in world trade, since its goods become cheaper in
foreign markets, while foreign goods become more expensive at home; simul-
taneously, it discourages imports. But if one country devalues, others may retaliate.
Such competitive exchange depreciation was, in fact, one of the reasons for the
establishment of the International Monetary Fund, which provides a forum for
international consultation on exchange rate changes."
When a government agency wishes to maintain some rate of exchange for its own
currency, but sees that the price of its currency is falling, it can hold up the price by
buying its own currency from foreigners, using either gold or its own foreign ex-
change holdings in payment. If the value of the pound is dropping in New York,
the Bank of England may buy pounds in New York, using in payment funds on
deposit in New York banks or buying dollars from the Federal Reserve System with
gold.' 2
If a government has a supply of gold and foreign exchange (including what it
can borrow from other countries or the International Monetary Fund) adequate to
meet ordinary emergencies, and if it can expect the outflow caused by such
emergencies to be offset by an inflow at some later date,"3 it can meet them by -its
ordinary price-support operations. If the emergency is severe or protracted enough,
then the authorities will allow the exchange rate to fall (since they will consider
" At the end of z958, Italy and Canada were the main trading countries whose currencies lacked a par
value, and Italy has, in fact, stabilized its exchange rates for considerable periods.
" No country may borrow from the IMF if it has not set an initial par value for its currency without
IMVP objection. In fact, France devalued its currency in 1948 without Fund approval. The power to
withhold loans is the main IMF weapon. Since a single violator of a price-fixing arrangement may, in
fact, gain considerable advantages, it is clear that there are circumstances when the Fund's sanctions would
be inadequate to deter violators. So far, the general dislike of price-cutting has prevented any major
test of the Fund.
" Exporters of country A with deposits in country B banks draw checks on these deposits to pay for
purchases of their own currency. These checks end up in the hands of the B's central bank. Checks on
banks in country A which these exporters receive in exchange (for deposit in their domestic bank
accounts) may turn out to be checks drawn by the central bank of B against its foreign accounts in
country A. No currency in gold is ordinarily shipped from one country to the other.
"a The Suez crisis of X956 created an expectation among traders that the British would have to
increase imports and reduce exports to a point where Bank of England gold and dollar reserves would
not be enough to support the price of $2.8o per Ci. In anticipation of devaluation and/or severe
restrictions on the acquisition of dollars, holders of sterling converted as much as possible into dollar
balances or United States goods. The authorities, in contrast, were convinced that the emergency was
temporary and sought temporary United States aid and a line of credit from the IMF. The authorities
were correct, and a "return to sterling" began in late 1957.
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their purchasing power insufficient to maintain it) or deny access to the foreign ex-
change market to some.
In the absence of government intervention or of countervailing private capital
movements, an increase in a country's imports would force down its exchange rate,
'leading to a series of price adjustments. At the lower exchange rate, exports would
tend to increase, but the internal prices of exported goods would rise to some degree
to offset this cheapening. At the same time, the lower exchange rates would tend
to make imports more expensive, reducing the demand for them, and hence their
price abroad. Thus, internal prices in all countries and exchange rates would tend
to change, with the changes being influenced also by traders' anticipations as to their
magnitude and duration.
Government intervention stabilizes the exchange rate. Changes in imports of
the sort just described would require the government to sell gold or foreign exchange
reserves to support the exchange rates. Then, (in somewhat oversimplified terms)
if the amount of money inside any country varies with gold reserves (so that an
increase in a country's imports automatically decreases its money supply), and if
internal prices vary with the money supply, exports will rise, imports will fall (since
the price level at home is now lower), and the gold flow will tend to stop without
any "structural" balance-of-payments problems-that is, problems which do not auto-
matically correct themselves.
A country at war cannot, however, export much, since the government's internal
purchases grow enormously. Its imports, however, tend to rise, because even normal
internal demand cannot now be met, given government demand for goods; and war-
time finance is usually inflationary, so that demand for imports rises above normal.
Likewise, an inflation not induced by war in a single country leads to rises in
domestic prices (and hence reductions in exports), accompanied by increased demand
for imports. These changes will force the government, if it is to maintain a given
exchange rate, either to pay out gold and foreign exchange reserves or to restrict
access to the foreign exchange market.
A depression in a single country has the opposite effect from an inflation. A
decline in internal demand lowers prices, reduces imports (which are no longer as
competitive at home), and increases the demand for exports.' 4 If, however, the
central bank ascribes the depression to lower investment and forces down interest
rates to encourage business borrowing, there may arise a demand for foreign securi-
ties, on which yields will not have fallen, and hence a need for support of the
exchange rate at the cost of foreign exchange reserves.'5 In general, the perversity of
"A major factor in postwar European thinking was the experience of 1929 and 1938, when de-
clines in United States economic activity led to flows of gold into the United States. This experience
seemed repeated in 1949, when a United States recession coincided with internal inflation in the United
Kingdom. It was clearly not repeated in 1954 or 1957, when other United States recessions took place.
"
5 In the United States recessions of 1953-54 and 1957-.58, sharp declines in Un.ted States interest
rates led American banks to move funds to London, where interest rates continued high. Thus, the
United States lost gold despite the recession, rather to the surprise of most economists. See 40 FEn.
Rasarva BuLL. 1126, 1127 (1954); 44 id. at 1131 , 1132 (1958).
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capital movements with respect to business cycle changes in the 193o's led to a
tendency by governments after 1945 to treat capital movements as being separate from
commodity movements and to subject them to distinct sets of controls. '
During the early i93o's, when the major industrial countries underwent more
or less severe depressions, the problem of inflation assumed a special form. For any
single country endeavoring to stimulate economic activity was apt to find that its
efforts raised its internal price level and worsened its foreign trade position1 7 The
problem then seemed to be that internal recovery could be achieved only at the cost
of scarce foreign exchange reserves. The elaborate exchange controls of Germany,
whose recovery was primarily induced by military expenditures, were the most
dramatic, but not the only, example of this phenomenon.
In all these cases, government actions in the foreign exchange markets are de-
signed to enable the government to carry out other policies without changing the
exchange rate or finding itself without foreign exchange reserves. A government is
never without internal financial resources-since as a last resort, it can always print
paper money-but it may be seriously handicapped for lack of foreign exchange.
In special cases, moreover, a government must even consider the actions of non-
residents. Thus, the United Kingdom has a special problem in its sterling liabilities.
These represent the sterling holdings of nonresidents, only part of whom are in the
Commonwealth. In 1947, the United Kingdom, under United States pressure,
allowed certain nonresidents the right to convert these holdings into United States
currency, causing a loss of almost a billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves in a
few months. The importance of London as a center for foreign deposits has had
especial historic significance, but at present, a similar situation is increasingly noted
in the United States. Thus, at the end of 1958, foreign short-term assets in this
country amounted to about $r6,ooooooooo, while United States gold reserves totaled
$2o,6oo,ooo,ooo2- s The chances of a general removal of these assets seem as small at
present as did the chances of a liquidation of the sterling balances in England in the
last century.
Thus, the stability of foreign exchange markets cannot be dissociated from gov-
ernment operations. The government, in the narrow sense, wants to maintain ex-
change rate stability without undue risk of running short of foreign exchange. But
the government, in the broader sense, intervenes in these markets because its other
economic operations affect and are affected by them. If it feels that its sales of gold
or foreign exchange are temporary and that business conditions will alter in such a
way as to enable it to stop selling gold (or even to buy back what it has sold), it
may have no compelling reason to do anything.j9 If, however, all foreign exchange
10 See loHNi H. WILLIAaoS, PosTwAR CURRENCY PLANs esp. CC. 9, I1 (2d ed. 1945).
'
T RAGNAR NuRxSE, INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY EXPERIENCE (1944), gives an excellent discussion of the
relation between internal stability and the international position of central banks in the interwar period.
1 45 FED. REsERVE BULL. 155, 210 (1959).
'o The IMF distinguishes between "structural" troubles and those which will correct themselves. It
will lend foreign exchange in the latter, but not in the former situation. The problem, of course, is to
diagnose a trouble correctly.
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reserves are apt to be spent, (i) the exchange rate must be abandoned as untenable,
(2) exchange controls must be instituted, or (3) internal government policies leading
to the loss of reserves must be abandoned. The last possibility is frequently the
most efficacious, but can only be touched on here °
B. Foreign Exchange Controls
Foreign exchange controls may be most intricate.2 They differ (x) according to
the number of control systems a country has, and (2) according to the variations in
exchange rates permitted.
A control system is a rule under which a buyer of foreign exchange is permitted
to use foreign exchange 2 A transaction in goods and the corresponding foreign
exchange transaction are authorized within certain quantitative limits, so that the
market price is available only up to a certain volume of business, even if both parties
are willing to do more.-3 Imports or exports beyond the limit may be allowed, sub-
ject to a penalty or premium rate of exchange. At the basic rate of exchange, how-
ever, buyers or sellers are willing to .buy or sell more than they are permitted by the
government.
Such control requires that no importer bring goods into the country without gov-
ernment consent. The only sure way of enforcing the rule is by seeing to it that
only the government has foreign exchange (including gold) with which to make
payments. But if exporters must sell their foreign exchange earnings to the govern-
ment 24 and if registration of foreign assets25 held by residents of the country is
required, normal sources of foreign exchange earnings are channeled into government
accounts, and payments out of these accounts are made subject to controls.
This sort of system centralizes a country's foreign exchange in government
hands 6 The government may maintain a par value on those transactions with non-
residents and conduct transactions with its own residents at prices which differ
20 The discussion in this paper all runs in terms of losses of foreign exchange reserves. Actually, in-
flows of foreign exchange assets and gold may also provide special problems. Thus, since 595o, German
policy has been to try to avoid an increase in these assets without allowing price increases, which are
anathema in a country whose monetary system has twice completely collapsed in forty years. The acquisi-
tion of $6,ooo,ooo,ooo in gold and foreign exchange is a remarkable achievement, and the problems
caused by it, like all embarrassments of riches, are somewhat less urgent than those discussed here.
2'The Annual Reports on Exchange Restrictions published by the International Monetary Fund are
the most complete single cataloging of the restrictions in the postwar period. For the interwar period, see
HEINRIcH HEUSER, CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1939).
2 Technically, the buyer may require a license to import foreign goods, or an authorization to pay
for them in the exporter's currency, or both. Administrative problems may arise where one license,
but not the other, is granted; but these will not be discussed.
"
8 Similar controls may exist over exports, so that sales beyond a certain limit are not authorized.
In Ames, Economic Integration in the European Soviet Bloc, in Am. EcoN. Ass'N, PROCEEDINOS (1958),
the writer has outlined some aspects of economic equilibrium in trade of this sort.
, If exports require a license, exporters may be required to deposit with the government accounts
abroad a sum equal to the invoice value of their exports within a stated period after the goods leave
the country. The government will then reimburse them in their own currency on the basis of their
exchange-control rules.
" Such registration, however, has proved particularly hard to enforce.
"In the postwar period, over half of the United States bank deposits of foreigners have been
official; and many of the private deposits are, in fact, only temporary.
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widely from the par values. It may, in principle, in trade with n countries involving
m commodities have n x m different effective exchange rates and n x m rules gov-
erning foreign exchange transactions. The larger the number of separate controls
and exchange rates, the more difficult it is to operate the system purposefully, as the
greater becomes the administrative cost and the less the intelligibility of the rules to
their administrators. Without actually importing and exporting on its own account,
however, the government can produce an incentive for private businesses to execute
many of the same transactions a government trading agency would carry on in its
own name.
The first major type of exchange control is a control over the selection of
partner countries (or, more properly, currencies) by residents engaging in foreign
trade. Countries where internal prices are high (relative to exchange rates) are more
attractive as markets for exports and less attractive as sources of imports. Such
countries, however, are apt to be countries which themselves have exchange controls.
That is, their governments refuse to provide third currencies to importers, so that
their trading partners will be forced to buy from them as well as sell to them (thus
reducing the pressure on their foreign exchange reserves). Just as devaluation may
provoke retaliation, so may exchange controls. If country A normally uses its ex-
ports to B to pay for its imports from C, B's exchange controls may interfere with
this transfer and perhaps lead A to limit its trade with B, unless B permits transfer.
This tendency toward bilateral trade and exchange controls in Europe after World
War 1127 was only gradually overcome, as European economic conditions improved,
using the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and later its offspring,
the European Payments Union. A general reduction in European exchange rates
(increase in European gold prices) in September 1949 provided a rough correction
for the greater wartime price rise in Europe than in the United States, so that in
i95o, the European Payments Union re-established, with some limitations, general
multilateral exchange within Europe. Restrictions on trade with the United States
and Canada continued, but were gradually relaxed, since the prices in these countries
rose more rapidly in the i95o's than European prices, reducing the pressure on
European reserves.28 At the end of 1958, most of the remaining controls on the
ability of nonresidents to convert European balances into dollars were removed, and
restrictions on European trade with dollar countries were lessened. Thus, this type
-7 In considerable degree, European prices were abnormally high because of wartime demand infla-
tion and damage to plant. Reconstruction was, of'course, speeded by United States Government aid, a
subject of great importance, but beyond the scope of this paper. Greater European output would, in
these circumstances, decrease (rather than increase) demand for United States goods, tend to increase
exports, as plant resumed production, and thus decrease the general pressure on European exchange
reserves, permitting decreases in exchange controls.
"' At the end of 1950, the United States had gold reserves of $22,8oo,ooo,ooo, and European count
tries had $7,300,000,000 plus $2,9oo,ooo,ooo in short-term claims on the United States. At the end of
x958, the United States had gold reserves of $2o,6oo,ooo,ooo, and European coulitrjes had $13,400,ooo,ooo
plus $7,800,000,000 short-term claims on the United States. International Financial Statistics, March 1959,
pp. i6, 36.
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of control, which predominated in the early postwar period, has.become relatively un-
important.
A second major type of exchange control is over the types of commodity in for-
eign trade. This control is particularly important in so-called underdeveloped coun-
tries, where governments are trying to industrialize more rapidly than business
processes would normally allow. In such a country, higher-income groups tend to
buy foreign goods or land rather than invest in domestic industry; and any invest-
ment requires imports of capital goods. Government investment is apt to be financed
by inflation (where there is no local capital market or a poorly developed tax system),
so that the programs lead not only to large capital goods imports, but also to in-
creased luxury consumer goods imports; and exports tend to be priced out of world
markets.
The exchange-control system in these countries, then, offers favored rates to im-
porters of capital goods and to exporters, so as to permit the government to avoid the
drain on foreign exchange of its development program. With the general improve-
ment in the European payments situation since 1949, this type of exchange control is
probably the most prevalent today29
Whether the controls be set up by country or by commodity, licensing involves
(i) selection of firms eligible to receive licenses, and (2) periodic changes in licenses
given to any category of trader. Very complicated questions of law arise in daily
administration of such systems, and they cannot be treated here.
Two special types of control should be mentioned, albeit without much discussion.
The first connects an import to an export transaction: businesses producing for sale
in a low-cost (hard-currency) area may purchase raw materials in low-cost areas or
even receive a general import license as a reward for their sales; or importers from
high-cost (soft-currency) areas may receive some low-cost area license as a reward
for their efforts. The second permits unlimited sales or purchases of foreign ex-
change of certain areas (or for certain purposes), the price of the exchange
being, however, at a rate which is allowed to vary with demand and supply. Thus,
the government might fix an exchange rate for necessary imports and allow that on
luxuries to fluctuate.
Two consequences of exchange-control systems should be indicated. The first
is that the internal prices of a country may vary without reference to variations in
world prices. Where domestic prices would ordinarily be conditioned by world
prices (since importers and exporters alike will take advantage of differentials, when
29 One reflection of the change in the nature of global exchange controls is found in the geography
of United States foreign aid. Whereas in 1949, the United States spent $4,5oo,ooo,ooo in foreign aid
to Europe and $i,3oo,ooo,ooo in aid to Asia, the corresponding figures (excluding military aid) in 1957
were $5,ooo,ooo,ooo and $I,70o,ooo,ooo, respectively. Survey of Current Business, April 1950, p. 2o;
id., April 1958, p. 22. Moreover, while European gold and foreign exchange reserves were rising, as
indicated in note 28 supra, Asiatic reserves fell from $4,400,000,000 to $4oo,ooo,ooo. These changes
correspond roughly to (i) the solution of wartime inflationary problems in Europe, and (2) the appearance
of inflationary development finance in Asia.
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permitted to do so, thereby limiting price differences), exchange controls break this
link.
The second consequence is the involvement of the government in exchange equal-
ization?0 Even if import and export licenses balance international payments with-
out changes in gold and foreign exchange reserves, the government still has to settle
with businesses in its own country. That is, it collects domestic money from im-
porters (who have bought foreign currency from the government) and sells domestic
money to exporters (in payment for the foreign currency they have earned). In
order to encourage exports and discourage imports, so as to reduce the drain on its
foreign exchange reserves, a government may pay a premium on the former and a
penalty on the latter; this means an implicit devaluation.
If the controls are successful, they create domestic industries which may never
be able to compete successfully on world markets. If the government later wishes
to remove the controls, it may find important internal vested interests to oppose it.
If domestic and world prices differ, the government may have to subsidize export
industries or find itself dependent on profits earned from the sale of imports in-
ternally. Concentration of foreign exchange in government hands thus isolates in-
ternal prices from world prices and has important and complex internal repercussions.
The most enthusiastic proponents of exchange controls would argue that there are
cases where the pattern of resource utilization thus achieved can be more desirable
than that which would be achieved otherwise. Particularly in the underdeveloped
countries, the view is held that economic development (industrialization) requires
the abandonment of market processes and hence exchange controls.
It is, of course, hard to determine the effectiveness of these various control systems.
Even under as elaborate and efficient controls as those of the United Kingdom in the
late 1940's, traders were apparently able to move up to $400,000,000 and an equal
amount in European currencies in and out of the United Kingdom, merely by shifting
from thirty-days' arrears to thirty-days' prepayments on ordinary commercial trans-
actions (the Bank of England could not control these transactions more closely
within the limits of ordinary business practice) and cause very great erratic short-
term shifts in British reserves? 1 And there is ample evidence that countries plagued
by persistent monetary expansion have found it most difficult, even with controls, to
prevent imports from rising more than exports. 2  An extensive controversy has
raged between those who have maintained that exchange controls were primarily a
reflection of monetary inflation and would be unnecessary in a country with ade-
'0 The writer attempted a concise explanation of the fiscal consequences of separating domestic and
international prices in Ames, The Exchange Rate in Soviet-Type Economics, 35 Rmv. EcoN. & STAT. 337
(1953). This article explains the bookkeeping of a conceptually simple system of complete controls, which
is perhaps useful in understanding the more complex cases here discussed, where internal and world
prices are more or less free to fluctuate.
5 1 See Katz, Leads and Lags in Sterling Payments, 35 Rzv. EcoN. & STAT. 74 (953).
'a How else can one explain the persistent failure of efficient governments of law-abiding populations
to avoid undesired losses of foreign exchange, as in England from 1945-5o and Scandinavia generally
since 1945?
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quate crelit controls,': and those who have maintained that exchange controls
reflected mainly nonmonetary difficulties within the country which might be expected
to continue to threaten a country's foreign exchange reserves regardless of the mone-
tary policy it might pursue a4
Fina resolution of the dollar-shortage problem into monetary and nonmonetary
components would be a monumental task and cannot be undertaken hereY5
II
FOREIGN EXCHANGE ASSETS
All exchange-control systems concentrate foreign exchange in government hands
and thereby raise interesting political problems. On the one hand, a government's
foreign exchange is a bank deposit and is of interest to foreign exchange-control
authorities. If these choose, they can freeze it, cause it to be depreciated, limit
payments from it, and so on. On the other hand, one government cannot injure
other. governments without inviting retaliation. A system of protocol among central
bankers has developed to eliminate petty irritations, although, of course, major
differences of interest cannot be easily settled?' The possibility of such retaliation
increases the desirability of having gold rather than currency as a country's reserve.
The analysis of a country's foreign assets is somewhat deceptive, for similiarities
in procedure may conceal important differences in substance. In the absence of
exchange controls, a country's foreign assets indicate earnings which are an effective
source of purchasing power. However, with exchange controls, quite a different
situation may exist. Thus, during World War II, the Germans made large pur-
chases in Danubian and Balkan countries (and had considerable military expenses
for troops stationed there). These expenses were paid for in marks and credited
to bank accounts in the names, of the respective countries, increasing the foreign
exchange assets of the latter. On the other hand, the bank accounts could not
be used, and the transaction had the same nature as loans to Germany. German
purchases, moreover, had internal inflationary consequences in these countries. It
seems unlikely that these countries would have wished to finance Germany to this
extent in the absence of German troops in their vicinity ar
"
3 The annual reports of the Bank for International Settlements (Basle) are perhaps the most
effective current analyses from this point of view.
. "The annual Economic Survey of Europe, published by the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (Geneva), provides forceful expression of this view, particularly in the first decade after the
war. See also British Labor Party viewpoints, as expressed notably by Gaitskell, Kaldor, and Balogh.
THSomxs BALOGH, THE DOLLAR SHORTAGE (1949), in particular, provides an early statement of this
nonmonetary view.
as'SeeFurth, The World Dollar Problem, XI WORLD POLITICS 262 (1959).
" J. -W. BErt, MONEY IN A MAELSTROM (1949), gives a combination of personal reminiscences
and monetary analysis in which these aspects of international central banking are prominent. The author
has played a prominent rold in Netherlands central banking and also in the Bank for International
Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.
" The wartime annual reports of the Bank for International Settlements are still the best source on
this subject.
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On the other hand, many members of the British Commonwealth allowed their
balances with the Bank of England to rise greatly during the war, although Canada
provided aid in a form basically analogous to lend-lease. Australian contributions
to the United Kingdom during the war would not differ in form from Hungarian
contributions to Germany; but the substance was different. While Canadian aid
was in the nature of a donation, the sterling balances of the other Commonwealth
countries were, in effect, loans, and they have been to a considerable extent repaid to
enable them to finance postwar import surpluses.
The United States has never had exchange controls for balance-of-payments
reasons, and for many years, it has been the largest owner of gold in the world.
There has been no compelling reason for the United States Government to keep for-
eign balances for monetary purposes. However, since World War II, the United
States Government has been involved in foreign exchange transactions for a variety of
reasons. First, a large military establishment has been maintained abroad. Currency
of the countries in which these troops are stationed is needed partly to pay the
troops and partly also to pay local costs, including the construction of installations.
Second, national security policies have permitted offshore procurement: the United
States wishes to aid the defense program of country X; it purchases arms for X
in country Y; it must, therefore, from time to time, make purchases of Y's cur-
rency in connection with the aid program. The administrative arrangements
under these headings are, of course, complicated in detail, and need not be dwelt
on here. Some $i,iooooo,ooo was spent on offshore procurement in i956-57. '
Third, the United States has been involved with a series of foreign central-bank
balances which may be called counterpart funds. A government receiving United
States aid under some programs deposits the local currency equivalent of the aid
in special accounts, which may not be used without mutual agreement. Where
these funds are the result of selling aid goods to the public, increases in counterpart
reduce the cash assets of the public, and countries with inflationary problems have
sometimes left the funds on deposit, or even used them to retire part of the public
debt held by the central bank, so as to prevent their returning into circulation (this
latter alternative is not now possible). Alternatively, they may be used as a sub-
stitute for tax revenue by the recipient of the aid. The United States normally
claims credit for such internal expenditures, as having been financed by the proceeds
of United States grant aid.
In recent years, the United States has particularly encouraged foreign countries
to purchase surplus agricultural commodities by accepting payment for them in
counterpart funds rather than in United States dollars, so that a country may increase
its purchases from the United States without a drain on its exchange reserves.39
This has the political advantage for the United States of causing farm goods in
's Survey of Current Business, April 1958, P. 21.
In 1957 $6oo,ooo,ooo net of such purchases took place out of total nonmilitary aid of $2,300,ooo,ooo.
Id. at 2o.
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United States Government hands to disappear without spoilage, on the one hand,
or the appearance of a "giveaway," on the other. The foreign country, in its turn,
receives dollar purchasing power without either precisely accepting a gift or yet
promising to pay dollars for it. And while the United States acquires foreign
balances which are in some degree frozen-since they cannot, under international
agreement, either be converted into dollars or used to pay for ordinary imports
of the United States-its position with respect to the recipients of the surplus goods
can hardly be compared to that of the Balkan countries with respect to Germany,
or of Commonwealth countries with respect to the United Kingdom.40
CONCLUSIONS
The commitment to maintain a stable exchange rate and the need for foreign
exchange have close connections with the entire course of a country's internal eco-
nomic process. Internal events and, of course, the country's foreign policy taken
in the broad sense have repercussions upon the country's foreign exchange reserves.
These constitute the means by which the state can carry out its intentions inter-
nationally.
Analysis of these transactions inevitably, then, raises in technical terms the
question of whether a country's internal economic development (influenced as it
is by government action) is compatible with its international situation. As might be
expected, it is not always easy to determine which affects which. In some sense,
the absence of government action here implies a situation satisfactory to the gov-
ernment; but it cannot be inferred from the fact of government action whether the
disturbance arises from without or within.
A considerable part of the technical interest of the subject lies in the difficult
problem of deciding the precise consequences of any particular rule which a state
may set forth governing its operations in gold and foreign exchange. Usually, a
considerable variety of measures may have the same net effect on a country's inter-
national payments. In this case, then, the selection of a particular policy with regard
to state transactions in gold and foreign exchange must be examined in terms of
the government's internal objectives, given the state of the world economy. The
transactions here mentioned have effects on the way internal economic processes
work, so that it is quite possible for a country's internal and international economic
policies to be in conflict. In this event, the decision as to whether internal or inter-
national considerations must prevail will depend upon the realities of the situation
and the strength of the government's various commitments.
40 At the end of 1957, the United States had about Sr,7oo,ooo,ooo of these foreign exchange assets. Id.
at 22.
